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Waiting in the Hundred Acre Wood: 
Childhood, Narrative and Time in A. A. 
Milne’s Works for Children
Paul Wake
So they went off together. But wherever they go, and whatever happens 
to them on the way, in that enchanted place at the top of the Forest a little 
boy and his Bear will always be playing.
A. A. Milne, “An Enchanted Place”
Woodbine Meadowlark finds tragedy in the closing lines of A. A. Milne’s 
The House at Pooh Corner. As Christopher Robin takes his leave of Pooh 
at what is to be the end of Milne’s career as a writer of children’s stories, 
and consequently the last of the stories set in the Hundred Acre Wood, 
we are not, he insists, deceived by “the last pitiful sentence of the book, 
in which Milne asserts that in some sense Pooh and Christopher Robin 
‘will always be playing’” (Crews 84). Far from it, for Meadowlark “[t]he 
sentence takes on its full meaning only as we grasp its purpose of provid-
ing a counterweight to the inexorable pull of temporality that is dashing 
Christopher Robin away from us forever” (Crews 84). Somewhat embar-
rassingly, given that what is to follow takes seriously the functioning of 
temporality in Milne’s work for children, Meadowlark, that “free spirit 
unfettered by academic routine” is a fictional character, the creation of 
Frederick C. Crews in his parody of literary criticism The Pooh Perplex 
(1964). The genius of Crews’ “casebook” lies in the fact that its observa-
tions, about both literary criticism and Winnie-the-Pooh, are extremely 
well-observed with the effect that, as many critics writing on Milne have 
pointed out, the subsequent embarrassment of pursuing ideas so effectively 
parodied has led to a relative paucity of critical studies of Milne’s works 
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for children.1 But, while Crews selects the Winnie-the-Pooh stories as the 
subject of his analysis for just the same reasons that led Dorothy Parker 
to dub their author “Mr. A.A. (‘Whimsy-the-Pooh’) Milne” (437), namely 
their apparent slightness of both subject matter and style, his argument, 
through its very successes with the text, foregrounds not the impossibility 
of discussing the books, nor the ludicrous nature of critical studies, but 
rather the richly productive possibilities of analyzing children’s fiction. 
This is not, as Harvey C. Window (another of Crews’ creations) suggests, 
because Milne’s stories are somehow more than “merely . . . little episodes 
that will engage the attention of small children” (5), but precisely because 
they are texts for and about children.2
With this in mind, my intention here is to approach Milne’s popular 
works for children (When We Were Very Young [1924], Winnie-the-Pooh 
[1926], Now We Are Six [1927], and The House at Pooh Corner [1928]) in 
terms of a temporality that is central to the construction of a childhood that 
is simultaneously assumed and defined in terms of both the child within 
the text and the implied reader of the text. As Jacqueline Rose puts it, “[i]
f children’s fiction builds an image of the child inside the book, it does 
so in order to secure the child who is outside the book, the one who does 
not come so easily within its grasp” (2). It might indeed be argued that 
the child reader can only ever be an implied reader, constructed by, and 
only existing within (and for) what Seymour Chatman terms the “narrative 
transaction” (147).  
Accordingly, this study will follow the well-established, if occasionally 
controversial, assertion that childhood is, to quote Philippe Ariès, an “idea,” 
and a fairly recent one at that, and that it is thus possible to speak of the 
“discovery of childhood,” perhaps better rephrased in terms of “invention,” 
(which Ariès locates in the thirteenth century) and that the subsequent 
“evolution of the themes of childhood” (46), as evidenced by the history 
of art, clothing, games, and education, is the result of a discourse that 
has been largely circumscribed by adults. What makes Milne’s work for 
children so interesting in this respect is that it signals its recognition of 
the processes by which the childhood “space” is delineated within adult 
discourse, just as it partakes in the perpetuation of a largely Romantic 
myth of childhood. As Paula T. Connolly puts it, Milne, “a well-known 
satirist living during the age of the ‘Beautiful Child’ . . . both deconstructs 
and reifies notions of Wordsworthian Romanticism in these depictions of 
childhood” (190).3
Recognizing Milne as an ironist who willfully enters into a perpetu-
ally circular position in which the “writing” of childhood presupposes 
a knowledge of its subject (that can only emerge in the process of that 
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writing), this article will investigate the necessary connections between 
language and time as they are deployed in the construction of a version of 
childhood that is at all points defined in relation to the passage of time. I 
will proceed by characterizing Milne’s vision of childhood as atemporal 
through a consideration of his verse before going on to consider the pos-
sibility of such stasis in relation to the work of Augustine and Paul Ricoeur 
whereby the connection between the experience of time and the successful 
deployment of language and narrative begins to emerge. Continuing to 
explore the connection between language and time I argue that Milne’s 
texts, read here in parallel with commentary on child language acquisition, 
dramatize the resistance of, and final entry into, the symbolic order of a 
shared language that instigates the shift from the predominantly spatial 
world of the young child into the temporally inflected/infected experi-
ence of adulthood. Finally, I will go on to suggest that what emerges in 
Milne’s stories is a reversal of Crews’/Meadowlark’s claim that temporality 
is dashing Christopher Robin away from us to the opposite position in 
which temporality pulls Christopher Robin, and the child in general, into a 
continuity with adulthood that paradoxically demands that it must engage 
in a temporality that is premised on the fact of its own passage.
From “When” to “Now”: A-temporality in Milne’s Verse
The connection between childhood and time is immediately suggested 
by the titles of Milne’s When We Were Very Young and Now We Are Six 
which, structured as they are around “whens” “weres” and “nows,” insist 
on locating childhood in terms of temporality.4 While the “we” common 
to both collections suggests a level of homogeneity in the experience of 
a well-heeled Edwardian childhood, they are, as Frank Swinnerton puts 
it, “verses for and about the children of pleasantly circumscribed parents” 
(124), the titles suggest a certain divergence in the approach to the con-
struction of the time of childhood. While both function on an obviously 
nostalgic level the first (“When”) figures youth as something belonging to 
the past, while Milne’s 1927 volume is figured in the present, its “Now” 
locating the collection in a perpetual present and offering a faint, but dis-
tinctly audible, echo of Wordsworth’s homily to youth “We Are Seven” 
(1798), a poem which in common with his other verses on childhood 
reflects an anxiety about the passing of the innocence of youth. Milne’s 
verse answers this apparent disquiet with a nostalgic retreat into a fantasy 
of an extra or atemporal childhood space that is characterized largely by 
the domestic space of the nursery. For Wordsworth, whose writings are 
of a more philosophical, and perhaps more pessimistic, bent than Milne’s 
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avowedly “light verse,” this childhood innocence is preserved, if not by 
a retreat into the pastoral landscape, then by death in infancy. This idea 
finds its clearest expression in “The Danish Boy” (1799) whose subtitle “a 
fragment” comments appropriately on the nature of this eternal (unfinished) 
childhood. Childhood in Wordsworth’s poem is sustained in death, “Like 
a dead Boy he is serene” (131): as Franco Ferruchi puts it, “the child [in 
Wordsworth’s verses] . . . dies in order to not to . . . he dies to re-become 
a child—an eternal child” (124).
A version of this “eternal child” (re)appears in Milne’s verse where 
childhood is refigured not in terms of the eternal but in terms of an atempor-
ality that places it outside of time and in doing so echoes the Romantic 
nostalgia of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile (1762):
Love childhood, indulge its sports, its pleasures, its delightful instincts. Who 
has not sometimes regretted that age when laughter was ever on the lips, 
and when the heart was always at peace? Why rob these innocents of the 
joys which pass so quickly, of that precious gift which they cannot abuse? 
Why fill with bitterness the fleeting days of early childhood, days which 
will no more return for them than for you? (43)
That Milne too wishes to pause in the pleasures of a childhood that is, for 
Rousseau at least, defined by its passage, is confirmed in the introduction 
to Now We Are Six, where the reader is informed: “We want you to know 
that the name of the book doesn’t mean that this is us being six all the 
time, but that it is about as far as we’ve got at present, and we half think 
of stopping there” (viii). This “half thought” desire to pause in the “now” 
of childhood finds its fullest expression in the poems that make up the 
two volumes as a philosophy of childhood that appears in both the form 
and content of the poems that make up the two volumes. The clearest 
expression of Milne’s desire, ironic or not, to sustain the Wordsworthian 
ideal of childhood innocence while rejecting the stasis promised by infant 
mortality can be seen in the relationship, noted by Thomas Burnett Swann, 
between Milne’s “Forgotten” and Eugene Field’s “Little Boy Blue” (1888), 
both of which concern toys in a nursery awaiting the return of their young 
owners. “Forgotten” begins:
Lords of the Nursery
Wait in a row, 
Five on a the high wall, 
And five on the low ;
Big Kings and Little Kings, 
Brown Bears and Black,
All of them waiting
Till John comes back. (Now, 95)
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Field’s “Little Boy Blue” begins opens in a world that is already in de-
cay:
The little toy dog is covered with dust,
But sturdy and stanch he stands;
And the little toy soldier is red with rust,
And his musket moulds in his hands.
Time was when the little toy dog was new,
And the soldier was passing fair;
And that was the time when our Little Boy Blue
Kissed them and put them there. (185–86)
Despite the similarity of this nursery scene, there is a marked difference in 
the treatment of the theme. As Swann puts it, “John [the child protagonist 
of Milne’s poem] who has been skipping rope and playing ball, returns 
at night and contentedly goes to bed with his toys. Little Boy Blue, on 
the other hand, has died; and his toys must wait and wait for the master 
who never returns” (83–84). While in Field’s poem the toys rust, the child 
they await apparently dead, the return of “John boy” [my emphasis], the 
child of Milne’s poem for whom markers of youth are inseparable from 
his identity, marks the deferral of the passage of youth that perpetuates 
the child’s life in the nursery. This response to Milne’s poem is reinforced 
by allusions to Wordsworth’s “Michael” (1800). Just as Michael loses his 
son Luke to the vices associated with adulthood in the “dissolute city” 
(109), Milne’s “Lords of the Nursery” find themselves caught between a 
timeless pastoral and an urban loss of innocence, 
Some saw the sheep-fold,
Some saw the mill;
Some saw the roofs
Of the little grey town . . . 
And their shadows grew long
As the sun slipt down. (Now 98)
Milne looks to the sheep-fold which, like the nursery, is a site of appar-
ent safety to which return is always desirable and which reappears in a 
more concrete form, as I will go on to discuss, in the pastoral space of 
the Hundred Acre Wood.
“The End,” the last poem of Now We Are Six, which is most definitely 
not a “concluding” poem, similarly recall’s Milne’s introduction to that 
volume to insist on this eternal return of the child:
When I was One,
I had just begun.
Childhood, Narrative and Time in A. A. Milne’s Works for Children 31
When I was Two,
I was nearly new.
When I was Three
I was hardly me.
When I was Four,
I was not much more.
When I was Five,
I was just alive.
But now I am Six, I’m as clever as clever,
So I think I’ll be six now for ever and ever. (102)
On the one hand this is a poem that is entirely concerned with questions 
of time as its protagonist (E. H. Shepard’s illustration is of Christopher 
Robin) counts through his birthdays. Yet the temporality in this poem 
lacks a sense of causality; its brief, fragment-like, verses, marked by their 
insistent repetition of “Whens,” suggest nothing more than a series of past 
instants that remain apparently unconnected. The sense of temporal stasis 
that emerges in this series of temporal locations appears in the final lines as 
a desire for an eternal youth; the end-stopped couplet halts the movement 
of the poem through time as it reaches a “now” that replaces the “was” 
of the previous four verses, a “now” that is placed in the center of the 
concluding line, elongating the alexandrine by taking the present, the word 
now, as caesura, a point at which to pause, in place of the comma of the 
preceding line. In “The End,” the Romantic nostalgia for a past childhood 
does not simply consign it to the past. Rather, childhood is placed outside 
of the temporal in a space that is clearly demarcated as being somehow 
extra-temporal, at least in the sense that it belongs to an instant that stands 
outside of the progression of time. For Rousseau this accurately reflects 
the child’s own concept of time: talking of childhood promises he notes, 
“when he [the child] promises for the future he promises nothing, and his 
imagination is as yet incapable of projecting him into the future while he 
lives in the present” (66).
Milne’s exploration of the nature of this childish “present,” an “a-tem-
poral present” that I am suggesting is figured as somehow being outside 
of time, finds perhaps its clearest expression in “Halfway Down,” which 
offers a model of a childhood that is perpetually caught in the “now”: 
between a “were” and a “will be,” a past and a present, that is excluded 
from its identity:
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Halfway down the stairs 
Is a stair
Where I sit. 
There isn’t any
Other stair
Quite like
It. 
I’m not at the bottom, 
I’m not at the top;
So this is the stair
Where
I always
Stop.
Halfway up the stairs 
Isn’t up
And isn’t down. 
It isn’t in the nursery,
It isn’t in the town.
And all sorts of funny thoughts 
Run round my head: 
“It isn’t really
anywhere!
It’s somewhere else
Instead!” (When 81)
This childish stoppage, this non-place, which “isn’t really anywhere” and 
which, at the point of its location, is “somewhere else instead” recalls, in 
spatial rather than temporal terms, Saint Augustine’s attempt to account 
for the notion that the present has no duration in book eleven of Confes-
sions where he writes that,
the only time that can be called present is an instant, if we can conceive of 
such, that cannot be divided even into the most minute fractions, and a point 
of time as small as this passes so rapidly from the future to the past that its 
duration is without length. For if its duration were prolonged, it could be 
divided into past and future. When it is present it has no duration. (266)
Augustine continues, “How, then, do we measure present time, when pres-
ent time has no duration? It must be measured while it is in the process 
of passing. It cannot be measured after it has passed, because nothing 
then exists to be measured” (269). The answer, according to Augustine, 
lies in the narrating activity that allows time to appear and the move that 
he makes to place man in opposition with an “eternal” God for whom 
“nothing is transient” (228) and whose “vision of occurrence is not tem-
porally conditioned” (221) emphasizes the “made” nature of time and the 
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sense that the perception of time requires its passage: grasping the present 
relies, in a sense, on memory. As Henri Bergson puts it, “[w]ithout the 
survival of the past into the present, there would be no duration, but only 
instantaneity” (Metaphysics 45).
According to Paul Ricoeur, who offers a consideration of Augustine’s 
Confessions and Aristotle’s Poetics in the first volume of Time and Narra-
tive, “time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the 
manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it 
portrays the features of temporal experience” (3). Like Mikhail Bakhtin, 
who would write in The Dialogic Imagination that “literature’s primary 
mode of representation is temporal” (146), Ricoeur regards narrative as a 
time-bound form which organizes and interprets events within a temporal 
framework in order to make them intelligible on what he describes as a 
“human level.” Ricoeur pursues the hypothesis that narrative is not only 
always temporal but also that it allows the only access to temporality, 
arguing that “speculation on time is an inconclusive rumination to which 
narrative activity alone can respond” (6). Similarly Frank Kermode, who 
also cites Aristotle in his discussion of plotting, describes literary plots as 
“images of the grand temporal consonance” (17). Thus the experience of 
time comes to be connected to linguistic, narratological, competence: As 
Hayden White summarizes, “it would follow that the absence of narrative 
capacity or a refusal of narrative indicates an absence or refusal of meaning 
itself” (2). The implications of such a position for a segment of society 
(children) that is defined, as I will go on to discuss further, by its lack 
of linguistic competence, are both inevitable and profound. To claim that 
the child’s understanding of the world necessarily moves from the purely 
bodily to the narratological is, following Ricoeur’s conception of narra-
tive, to suggest that the child necessarily comes to apprehend the world, 
and by extension itself, in relation to a concept of time that is predicated 
on notions of causality and progression and which must, given that the 
child is, in legal terms at least, defined in terms of age, entail an aware-
ness that childhood must eventually be abandoned in the very process by 
which it is identified.5
The Child and/in Language
The move from infancy to childhood is, according to Rousseau at least, 
quite literally defined by the acquisition of language. In book two of Émile, 
as his focus turns to language, he notes that, “we have reached the second 
phase of life; infancy, strictly so-called, is over; the words infans [infant] 
and puer [child] are not synonymous. The latter includes the former, which 
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means literally ‘the who cannot speak’” (41). The significance of language 
as a marker of a child’s development is confirmed by the writings of child 
psychologists and educational theorists such as Jean Piaget and Kieran 
Egan who, despite the many points of divergence in their work, appear 
to be in agreement that the child’s progression through each “phase” 
(Piaget) or “stage” (Egan) is marked by the acquisition of, and increas-
ingly sophisticated deployment of, language. Thus Rousseau’s “infans” 
corresponds closely with Piaget’s “sensory motor period” (birth – 2 years), 
which is followed by the “pre-operational phase” (2 – 7 years) in which the 
child’s rudimentary usage of language consists of “monologues” that are 
markedly egocentric, and which is supplanted by the period of “concrete 
operations” (7 – 11 years) which is characterized by the loss of the kind 
of egocentric thinking that defines the pre-operational phase and in which 
the use of language becomes increasingly sophisticated and socialized 
(Piaget 2000). In Egan’s model the pre-linguistic “somatic” stage (birth 
onwards), in which understanding is defined as “the sense of a knowledge 
from the body, beyond human words” (Mind 186), is followed by the 
“mythic” (4/5 – 9/10 years) and the “romantic” (8/9 – 14/15 years). As 
with Piaget’s model, the movement between these stages is characterized 
by an increasingly sophisticated ability to use language.
Egan, who cautions against the level of Piaget’s influence on contem-
porary educational practice, and who rejects what he sees as Piaget’s 
emphasis on logico-mathematical thinking, offers a model for education 
that is marked by the deployment of various levels of narrative under-
standing, what he terms “metaphorical competence” (Mind 50). Indeed 
Egan’s description of the “move from the mythic to the romantic stage” 
in terms of “the development of rudimentary but serviceable concepts 
of ‘otherness’; concepts of historical time, geographical space, physi-
cal regularities, logical relationships and causality” (Development 28) is 
closely modelled on narrative theory and draws on the work of, among 
others, Aristotle, Frank Kermode, and Paul Ricoeur. Rejecting the notion 
that human experience is “essentially linguistic” (Gadamer 19), Egan 
argues that “stories should not be considered casual entertainment. They 
are embodiments of the fundamental structures of the human mind; they 
reflect and educate us in important ways of making sense of experience, 
of investing the world with meaning, and of putting world and experience 
into words” (Development 141). While Egan recognizes the implications 
of the embeddedness of narrative forms in cognitive development which 
lead to the assertion that “the story form . . . must lie at the heart of all 
attempts to make the world meaningful to young children” (Development 
17) he also recognizes that this development must come at a certain cost, 
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arguing that “it is a serious mistake to view education as an inevitably 
progressive process . . . while ignoring or neglecting the losses associated 
with each gain” (Mind 97). There is, however, in Egan’s recognition of 
the necessary losses attendant on a child’s development of non-somatic 
understanding (i.e., the forms of narrative understanding that he terms 
variously “mythic,” “romantic,” “philosophic” and “ironic”) none of the 
nostalgic regret that is found in the Romantic conception of the passage 
of childhood, a regret that finds perhaps its clearest expression in Émile 
where, in his determination to prolong the “naturalness” of childhood, 
Rousseau takes a stance that associates the artifice of acquired language 
with the loss of the natural, primal (somatic) self: 
All our languages are the result of art. It has long been a subject of enquiry 
whether there ever was a natural language common to all; no doubt there is, 
and it is the language of children before they begin to speak. This language 
is inarticulate, but it has tone, stress, and meaning. (32)
Taking a position that prefigures the linguistic insights of Ferdinand de 
Saussure and the later structuralist and post-structuralist work of writers 
such as Roman Jakobson, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida, Rous-
seau goes on to remark that, “languages as they change the symbols, also 
modify the ideas which the symbols express. Minds are formed by lan-
guage, thoughts take their colour from its ideas. Reason alone is common 
to all” (73). Writing over a century later, Henri Bergson, would make a 
similar observation about the effect of symbols on the experience of time, 
noting that the adult, linguistic, consciousness “goaded by an insatiable 
desire to separate, substitutes the symbol for the reality” (128), imposing 
a rigid temporal framework, which might be characterized as numerical 
and spatial in nature, on the time of the “fundamental self” that Bergson 
calls Durée and which may be one way of characterizing the temporality of 
the primal (somatic) space of childhood. It is the time of this fundamental 
self that Christopher Robin has reluctantly left behind by the end of the 
Winnie-the-Pooh stories which, as I shall go on to suggest in the follow-
ing reading of The House at Pooh Corner, might well be regarded as a 
dramatization of the movement from Durée to the “concrete” (Bergson, 
Time 128) spatialized time that is inherent in the processes of education 
and maturation.
The End of Pastoral Time in Winnie-the-Pooh and  
The House at Pooh Corner
That the Winnie-the-Pooh stories mark a departure from the a-temporal 
space explored in Milne’s verse is signalled by the opening chapter of 
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Winnie-the-Pooh which opens with a sense of motion that provides a 
sharp contrast to the temporal-spatial stasis of “Halfway Down”: “Here is 
Edward Bear, coming downstairs now, bump, bump, bump, on the back of 
his head, behind Christopher Robin” (1). Time in, and as, motion is now 
being asserted. When the story proper begins its “Once upon a time, a very 
long time ago now” (Milne, Winnie 2) echoes the ritualized beginning of 
stories for children that has always, rather perversely, had the appearance 
of introducing time while effectively locating what follows as outside of 
the temporal space within which the child-reader might be said to operate. 
Milne, recognizing this irony, offers an addendum to the storyteller’s cliché: 
his “very long time ago” is “about last Friday . . . ” (Winnie 2). This self-
reflexive nod at the formalities of storytelling acts with a humour that is 
suggestive of the manner in which temporality encroaches on Christopher 
Robin’s world in the stories that follow through a narrative structure that 
functions by “dédoublement” (213), to use Paul de Man’s terminology, in 
order that they might reflect on their own construction.
Whilst Winnie-the-Pooh and The House at Pooh Corner are characterized 
by an emergent sense of temporality it is a temporality that is repeatedly 
undermined and which is a somewhat uncomfortable and unwelcome 
development in the Hundred Acre Wood. The individual stories that make 
up the two volumes display a marked tendency not to progress: Humphrey 
Carpenter puts this well commenting that, “[i]n a sense there is no ‘story’ 
as such, only a set of incidents which could be put in almost any order” 
(202), thus making a helpful distinction between “story” and “incident,” 
where “story” implies causality and sequence. As a series of “incidents” 
the Winnie-the-Pooh stories resist the kind of causality demanded by 
Kermode’s conception of narrative in which literary plots are “images of 
the grand temporal consonance” and for which “the sense of an ending” 
is a prerequisite for beginning. There is, on the contrary, more often than 
not, “the sense of the beginning” in the endings of many of the Pooh 
stories—a fact suggested in the conclusion of “We are Introduced” when 
Christopher Robin, the narratee of the tale, interjects, “Is that the end of the 
story?” (Winnie 17) thereby breaking the “frame” of the story to reveal an 
ironically dédoubled nature that makes apparent the conflict between the 
a-temporal space of the Hundred Acre Wood and an encroaching causal 
temporality. Temporality is thus conceived as being external to a childhood 
world that is usefully conceived of in terms of the enclosed world of the 
pastoral where that enclosure is both spatial and temporal.
While critics have been quick to connect the “idyllic rural setting” 
(Wullschläger 184) of the Hundred Acre Wood with Milne’s home on 
the edge of Ashdown Forest, and to recognize it as “Arcadia evoked in 
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all its seasons as an English pastoral dream” (Wullschläger 190-91) the 
pastoral oasis is not simply a green space. As Renato Pogglioli puts it, 
“[p]astoral poetry . . . fixes the pastoral moment, within the category of 
space as well as of time, as an interval to be chosen at both the proper 
hour and the right point” (104). Andrew W. Ettin offers further comment 
on the character of this “pastoral moment”:
The notion of making time pause, even stop, or circle back to the begin-
ning (stretching duration, in other words) is basic to the pastoral instinct for 
enclosure. Being absorbed in a moment of blessed, privileged time means 
being settled into an emotionally comfortable experience. Whether attained 
or not, the desire for that is at the heart of the pastoral. (142)
The sense of Pastoral time as an enclosed and extended space emerges 
clearly in “Pooh and Piglet hunt,” the third story of Winnie-the-Pooh, a 
literally circular tale that sees Pooh and Piglet trace and retrace their own 
footsteps around “a small spinney of larch trees” (34). This circularity is 
emblematic of the two volumes in which the stories are often as much 
about things not happening as they are about things happening as is seen 
in “Pooh Builds a House” where Pooh, on knocking at Piglet’s door and 
finding him out, “Waited for Piglet not to answer” [my emphasis] (Winnie 
1). Thus the reader of the two volumes encounters stories about not catching 
Woozles, not catching Heffalumps, of building houses that have already 
been built, and of “expotitions” to nowhere, all of which are punctuated by 
Pooh’s interminable, inconsequential, and often repetitive, “hums.” Indeed, 
the success of the “Expotition to the North Pole” is predetermined in that 
the object sought is defined by the very act of its being found. This is a 
circular logic that is clear in the message with which Christopher Robin 
claims (and names) the “North Pole”:
NorTH PoLE
DICSovERED By
PooH
PooH FouND IT. (Winnie 116)
The appeal to the child reader of such stories lies in recognizing the gentle 
humour that comes at the expense of their protagonists, a move that neces-
sarily entails adopting a position that places the reader outside of both the 
stories and the a-temporal pastoral space that they occupy. Accordingly, 
while the Winnie-the-Pooh stories are well described by Ettin’s “emotion-
ally comfortable experience” they also dramatize the dissolution of this 
“moment of blessed, privileged time” (142).
This positioning of the reader without the texts is paralleled by the 
over-arching story of Christopher Robin within the texts as it becomes 
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increasingly apparent that his role is not that of protagonist in but as an 
observer and interpreter of stories. This movement from character to nar-
ratee is demonstrated within the text of “Pooh and Piglet Hunt” in which 
it emerges that Christopher Robin has been watching the “hunt” as it has 
unfolded from the vantage point of the branches of an oak tree: “ ‘Silly 
old bear,’ he said, ‘what were you doing? First you went round the spin-
ney twice by yourself, and then Piglet ran after you and you went round 
again together, and then you were just going round a fourth time . . .’ ” 
(Winnie 37). Speaking from this location positions Christopher Robin as 
a reader of the texts even as he appears within the texts, prefiguring his 
eventual removal from the world of the Hundred Acre Wood as he comes 
to be increasingly aligned with the meta-level of the narrating act that 
generates the stories to which he listens.
While in Winnie-the-Pooh the meta-level of the storytelling act recurs 
in a number of the stories, offering a clear connection between Christo-
pher Robin as both recipient of and character in the stories, “(‘Was that 
me?’ said Christopher Robin in an awed voice, hardly daring to believe 
it . . .)” (10), The House at Pooh Corner denies this sense of reciprocity. 
The exclusion of Christopher Robin from the pastoral space of the stories 
takes place in the introduction, or as Milne puts it “Contradiction,” to The 
House at Pooh Corner, which operates at a meta-level that points to a 
space “outside” of the stories proper. This section, which announces the 
end of the stories that will be told about Pooh, introduces on a structural 
as well as a literal level the removal of Christopher Robin from those 
stories. It is at this meta-level that the narrator (Milne) and the narratee 
(Christopher Robin) are able to discuss the stories as stories and are able, 
in their excitement about mathematics, to neglect Pooh who is left to think 
“Grand Thoughts to himself about Nothing” (House ix–x).
Indeed, if The House at Pooh Corner might be said to move beyond 
the “incidents” that constitute its individual chapters toward an identifiable 
“story” in the sense intended by Carpenter then it is the story of Christopher 
Robin’s education. Alison Lurie’s comment that “[i]t is Education that 
will, by the end of The House at Pooh Corner, have driven Christopher 
Robin out of his self-created Eden” (155) is borne out by “Rabbit’s Busy 
Day,” which takes as its center an absent Christopher Robin. The action 
concerns Rabbit’s attempts to decipher his cryptic note:
GON OUT
BACKSON
BISY
BACKSON
C.R. (House 75)
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The solution of the enigma comes in the form of a further note that is 
the perfect expression of Augustine’s description of the emergence of 
present time in relation to the memory of the past and the expectation 
of the future:
GONE OUT
BACK SOON
C.R. (House 88)
Christopher Robin is to be a withdrawal, marked here by the acquisition 
of a literary competence that is specifically connected with narrating time, 
to the plane of the narrating act from which he is eventually unable to 
return as he becomes complicit in the “we” invoked by Milne’s “No, you 
see, we have lost it . . .” (House x). Christopher Robin appears to respond 
to the imposition of time that is inherent in this alignment with the adult-
narrator when he tells Pooh,
“I’m not going to do Nothing any more.”
“Never again?”
“Well, not so much. They don’t let you.” (House 174–75)
In other words, it is in the assimilation into this somewhat ominous-
sounding “They” that facilitates both the appearance of childhood, as a 
concept that can be grasped and exchanged, and the necessity that child-
hood, defined as that which pre-exists the “They,” disappears.
The figuration of Christopher Robin as both a character within the stories 
and as an emergent reader (and occasional writer) of those stories empha-
sizes the distance between the level of the stories (what I have described as 
an atemporal pastoral space) and the level of their narration. The reader’s 
recognition of this distinction, which comes with the internalizing of the 
narrating act, generates the possibility of an understanding that is well 
described as “ironic.” As Egan puts it, describing the stage of understand-
ing that announces for him emergent adulthood: “The ironic mind . . . is 
interested in what ways the mind’s imposing order on, or making sense 
of, the world interferes with what is actually true about it” (Development 
84). In its emphasis on the discrepancy between word and world, Egan’s 
model of irony is closely allied to that of the Jena Romantics, demanding 
a self-reflexive awareness that is well described by Friedrich Schlegel 
as the “clear consciousness of eternal agility” (Wheeler 56). Moreover, 
Egan’s description of ironic understanding clearly recognizes narrative as 
a form of sense-making that is imposed on the world and which is all but 
inescapable. As Barthes famously remarked, “narrative is international, 
transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself” (78).
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The essential irony that appears in Milne’s fiction through the doubling 
of perspective common to ironic discourse is that while narrative allows 
the appearance of the child, it is narration that is at all points connected 
with temporality, which guarantees that the child as it appears in literature 
is necessarily constructed in terms that entail its passage. Nostalgia, in 
the sense of retrospection, is inevitable. Crews’/Meadowlark’s claim that 
temporality is dashing Christopher Robin away from us masks the process 
by which the child is recognized, or more properly speaking defined (in a 
process that is rather like Pooh’s “discovery” and “finding” of the North 
Pole), in a temporally-inflected discourse that can only grasp its object 
as a past object. The space of the Hundred Acre Wood has become “a 
remembered rather than present place” (Connolly 191) that is accessible 
only from, and as part of, this meta-level and it is the process of remem-
bering, or refiguring, that guarantees this loss; as Christopher Robin puts 
it, “I do remember, and then when I try to remember, I forget.” (Milne, 
Winnie 17).
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Notes
1 Noting the lack of critical work on Winnie-the-Pooh, Peter Hunt, remarked in 
2001: “Milne and Pooh have been magnificently served by two books which are 
models of their kind, both by Ann Thwaite: a biography, A. A. Milne, His Life, and 
a literary and sociological compendium, The Brilliant Career of Winnie-the-Pooh. 
We wait upon a volume of criticism that can rise to these heights” (102–03). For 
further commentary on the influence of Crews on subsequent criticism see Benedict 
Nightingale’s review of The Pooh Perplex in The Guardian, 18 Mar. 1964; Ann 
Thwaite, A. A. Milne (1990), 301–02; Alison Lurie, Don’t Tell The Grown Ups 
(1990), 145–46; and Jackie Wullschläger, Inventing Wonderland (1996), 198.
2 As Tom Payne remarks in relation to Crews’ sequel, Postmodern Pooh (2001), 
Crews “has fashioned arguments that are loopy for sure, but work” (Lezard).
3 Similarly Jackie Wullschläger notes that “Pooh’s forest is . . . shot through 
with irony,” before going on to conclude that “With Milne, the cult of the innocent 
child was over” (178, 186).
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4 The title of Milne’s first book for children, Once Upon a Time (1917), has a 
similar sense of contradictory impulses of a childhood that is figured as outside of 
“our” time and the centrality of time in the construction of narratives.
5 See, for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), published 
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and ratified by the 
majority of member nation states of the United Nations in 1989, which opens with 
the statement that: “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means 
every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable 
to the child, majority is attained earlier.” 
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